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Abstract
In this paper we propose new membership attacks and new at-
tack methods against deep generative models including Varia-
tional Autoencoders (VAEs) and Generative Adversarial Net-
works (GANs). Specifically, a membership attack is to check
whether a given instance x was used in the training data
or not. And a co-membership attack is to check whether
the given bundle n instances were in the training, with the
prior knowledge that the bundle was either entirely used in
the training or none at all. Successful membership attacks
can compromise privacy of training data when the genera-
tive model is published. Our main idea is to cast membership
inference of target data x as the optimization of another neu-
ral network (called the attacker network) to search for the
seed to reproduce x. The final reconstruction error is used di-
rectly to conclude whether x is in the training data or not. We
show through experiments on a variety of data sets and a suite
of training parameters that our attacker network can be more
successful than prior membership attacks; co-membership at-
tack can be more powerful than single attacks; and VAEs are
more susceptible to membership attacks compared to GANs
in general. We also discussed membership attack with model
generalization, overfitting, and diversity of the model.
1 Introduction
Deep generative models have been widely studied recently
as an effective method to abstract and approximate a data
distribution. Two of the most commonly used and efficient
approaches are Variational Autoencoders (VAEs) (Kingma
and Welling 2013a) and Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) (Goodfellow et al. 2014a). VAEs consist of a pair of
networks, the encoder and the decoder, and explicitly max-
imize the variational lower bound with respect to the joint
generative and inference models. GANs take a game theo-
retic approach and tries to achieve a good balance between
two strategic agents, the generator and discriminator net-
works. These generative models have been applied on com-
plicated real-world data, with a variety of applications: in
graphics, geometric modeling, and even for designing cryp-
tographic primitives (Abadi and Andersen 2016).
A successful machine learning model captures informa-
tion from the training dataset. At the same time, an adver-
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sary may gain knowledge about the training dataset by in-
teracting with the model. This information leakage problem
is formulated by the membership inference problem (Shokri
et al. 2016; Yeom, Fredrikson, and Jha 2017): given a model
and a data point, determine whether the data point was in
the training dataset of the model. This can be considered as
an attack to the privacy of the training data set. A successful
membership attack to a machine learning model means that
the privacy of the training data was not sufficiently protected
when the trained model is released.
In the literature, most membership attacks were designed
for classifiers. Fredrikson et al. (Fredrikson et al. 2014) pro-
posed to infer sensitive features of input data by actively
probing the outputs. Later, a more robust inversion attack
was developed (Fredrikson, Jha, and Ristenpart 2015), in
which attackers can recover part of the training set, such
as human faces. Shokri et al. (Shokri et al. 2017) tried to
predict whether a data point belongs to the training set.
More recently, a GAN-based trick has been proposed to at-
tack collaborative deep learning (Hitaj, Ateniese, and Perez-
Cruz 2017) for a distributed machine learning systems, in
which users collaboratively train a model by sharing gra-
dients of their locally trained models through a parameter
server. Given the fact that Google has proposed federated
learning based on distributed machine learning (McMahan
and Ramage 2017) and already deployed it to mobile de-
vices, such a GAN-based attack raises severe privacy threats.
Not much has been done on membership attacks of gen-
erative models. (Hayes et al. 2017) considered attacking
GANs and offered rankings for the target data based on
the probability of how likely the instance is in the training
set, but they cannot attack on individual instances. In De-
fenseGAN (Samangouei, Kabkab, and Chellappa 2018), a
defense/attack method called Direct Projection was intro-
duced, in which the input variable z to GANs is taken as
trainable variables and gradient descent is used to minimize
the difference of the generated data and target data x.
Our Contribution. In this article, we propose new member-
ship attacks and new attack methods for generative models.
First we consider both single membership attacks and co-
membership attacks. In a single membership attack, we are
given a single instance x and ask whether x was used in the
training. In a co-membership attack (co-attack), we are given
n instances with the knowledge that either all n instances
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were used in training or none was used. The co-membership
attack model happens in many real world scenarios, as often
an user contributes multiple data points to a training task –
for example, multiple pictures uploaded from a smart phone,
or multi-day data from a smart meter device.
We propose a new attack method. Given a generative
model G with a target x (or n targets in a co-attack), we
optimize another neural network A to produce an input to
the generative network such that the generated output nearly
matches x (or reproduces each of the n targets). If we are
able to reproduce elements in the training data but unable
to reproduce samples not in the training data, a membership
attack is successful. Notice that this is completely unsuper-
vised and the attacker network A starts with random val-
ues. Compared to the technique used in DefenseGAN, our
method works well with co-membership attacks, as knowl-
edge from multiple target instances could be extracted and
shared through the attacker network A while the direct pro-
jection method cannot share information across different tar-
get instances.
We evaluated our new attack methods for both VAEs and
GANs on a variety of data sets (MNIST, fashion MNIST,
and CIFAR-10) with a suite of parameters (different number
of training data, different architectures, training iterations,
etc). Our observations are:
• Co-membership attack are more powerful than single at-
tacks, even when n = 2.
• Our neural network based attacker is more powerful than
other optimization methods using gradient descent di-
rectly in the latent space (e.g., DefenseGAN).
• VAEs are more susceptible to membership attacks com-
pared to GANs in general.
In addition, we also discuss the success of membership at-
tack with a few other quality measures for generative model.
Generalization is arguably the most important objective for
a machine learning model, in which the model produces use-
ful results not only on the training data but also on data that
the model has not seen. For supervised learning, the gener-
alization error is the difference between classification error
on the training set and error on the underlying joint proba-
bility distribution. For generative models, there has not been
a standard measure of generalization. With a similar intu-
ition, we measure the generalization gap by the difference
of the reconstruction error by the membership attacker on
the training data and on the test data. Secondly, diversity
describes whether the generator can produce different sam-
ples (Arora, Risteski, and Zhang 2018). We use a measure
called dispersion to evaluate the diversity qualitatively. Dis-
persion with a parameter k is defined as the largest value of
closest pairwise distance of k points in the generated data.
We show that empirically, dispersion, generalization error,
and success rate of membership attack are all closely corre-
lated. When we take random samples from the training data
– the more training data we use, the smaller the generaliza-
tion gap, the higher dispersion in the generated data.
Last, we display a distinctive difference between diver-
sity and generalization. We apply our membership attack to
choose adversarial samples, that are hard to be reproduced
in the training phase by an attacker network. When we train
a new GAN using only these adversarial samples, compared
to a GAN trained by random samples with the same number
of training data, we can observe a sharp contrast of diversity
versus generalization. The GAN with adversarial sampling
shows much higher dispersion, but it is easy to launch mem-
bership attacks with a large generalization gap. This shows
that high diversity of a generative model cannot immediately
guarantee good quality and generalization. Adversarial sam-
ples focus too much on corner cases and therefore may not
effectively approximate the real distribution.
2 Membership Attacks Against Deep
Generative Models
In this section, we introduce an efficient and unsupervised
membership attack against different deep generative models,
and show that the generative models can indeed overfit and
reveal the training data.
Attacking GANs. Let x be a data instance with dimension
d. µreal is the distribution from which x is sampled from. So
x ∼ µreal. The objective of GANs (Goodfellow et al. 2014b)
is to learn the distribution µreal; practically GANs can be
used to generate new samples {x1,x2, . . . ,xm} to approx-
imate the distribution. To achieve the goal, GANs consist
of two components, the generator (Gθ) and the discrimina-
tor (Dφ). Gθ produces a sample and Dφ tries to distinguish
how likely the sample is from the output distribution of gen-
erator µGθ , where θ and φ are neural network parameters.
To generate a new data point x, generator Gθ takes a ran-
dom k-dimensional vector z and returns x = Gθ(z). The
discriminator Dφ is a function Rd → [0, 1]. The output of
Dφ(x) is interpreted as the probability for the data x to be
drawn from µreal. The objective of a GAN is
min
θ
max
φ
Ex∼µreal [logDφ(x)] + Ex∼µGθ [log(1−Dφ(x))].
In Wasserstein GAN (WGANs) (Arjovsky, Chintala, and
Bottou 2017), the measuring function is the identity function
instead of the log function in which the resultant objective is
min
θ
max
φ
Ex∼µreal [Dφ(x)]− Ex∼µGθ [Dφ(x)].
In the paper and our implementation, the Lipschitz con-
straint on the critic is implemented with weight clipping.
Empirically, WGANs are observed to better behave than the
vanilla counterpart so we use WGANs in our experiment.
We also test a recent variant of WGANs in (Gulrajani et al.
2017), denoted as iWGANs, which optimizes the same ob-
jective but enforcing the Lipschitz condition by penalizing
the norm of the gradient of the critic.
To perform membership attack against the generator Gθ
of a trained GAN for a given target instance x, we propose
to introduce an attacker A to synthesize a seed for Gθ so as
to generate an instance close to x. The pipeline of the mem-
bership attack is shown in Figure 1. Specifically, the attacker
is a neural network Aγ , parameterized by γ, which takes x
as input and maps from Rd → Rk. Here k is the input di-
mension of the generator. The objective of the attacker is
Adversary A
z
Gθ
∆(Gθ(z),x)
Target Instance x
Gθ(z)
small ⇒ YES
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Figure 1: Membership Attack (Gθ,x): Answer whether the target image x was used in the training data of Gθ. The left side
shows the attacker framework which uses the attacker loss ∆(Gθ(z),x) to determine membership.
to minimize a distance (reconstruction loss for the attacker)
between the data point x and the generated dataGθ(Aγ(x)):
min
γ
∆(x, Gθ(Aγ(x))). (1)
The result of the optimization problem 1 is used directly
to determine the membership of x. Intuitively, smaller re-
construction error indicates that x is more likely to be from
the training data. Note that the parameter γ of the attacker
network A is randomly initialized for a new attack so it does
not require any pre-training before performing any attack in
this unsupervised manner.
L2-distance is taken as our distance function ∆(·, ·)
throughout the paper. We would like to remark that our pro-
posed attack method is not specific to L2-distance. For dif-
ferent datasets, it is possible that other application oriented
metric might be used.
Attacking VAEs. VAEs (Kingma and Welling 2013b) are
good at changing or exploring variations on existing data
in a desired, specific direction. VAEs consist of a pair of
connected networks, an encoder and a decoder. An encoder
network takes in and converts an input into a dense repre-
sentation, while the decoder network converts it back to the
original input. The encoder qφ takes input data and outputs
two vectors: a vector of means µ, and a vector of standard
deviations σ. With re-parameterization, z = µ + σ is ob-
tained by sampling  ∼ N (0, 1). The decoder gθ takes z and
generates a data point gθ(z). The entire network is trained
with the objective as
min
θ,φ
−Eqφ(z |x)[log(p(x |gθ(z)))] + KL(qφ(z |x) ‖ p(z)),
where KL(p||q) is the KL-divergence of distributions p, q.
Similarly when conducting membership attack against
VAEs, we search for a particular z that can reproduce the
target image when z is fed to the decoder gθ. The objective
of the attacker is again:
min
γ
∆(x, gθ(Aγ(x))). (2)
In both optimization objectives 1 and 2, the attacker net-
work is trying to invert the generator. The generator takes a
seed z and outputs x, and the attacker takes x and looks for
z. In VAE, if the compact representation of the encoder has
the same dimension as the seed, this implies that the attacker
Aγ is very similar to the encoder.
White-box v.s. Black-box. If the internal structure of the
generator (decoder) G is exposed (i.e., in a white box at-
tack), we can find an analytical gradient of the distance
w.r.t. γ. Otherwise, it is called a black box attack. And
we need to use finite-difference to approximate the gradi-
ent: l′(γ)i =
l(γ+ei)−l(γ)
ei
where l(γ) = ∆(x, G(Aγ(x))).
In this case, the optimization of the attacker requires more
black-box accesses to the generator (decoder). In this work,
we focus on the white-box setting to explore what a powerful
adversary can do based on the Kerckhoffs’s principle (Shan-
non 1949) to better motivate defense methods.
Single Attack v.s. Co-Attack. The attack framework in-
troduced is able to launch membership attack against a sin-
gle target by optimizing an instance of attacker network Aγ .
This is called a single attack. If the attacker has more infor-
mation about several target instances (for example, the target
instances are known to be either all from training or testing
data), we can co-optimize one single γ to co-attack related
instances at the same time instead of initializing a new γ for
each target instance. The information of multiple instances
will be fused together to guide a attacker network Aγ . This
is termed as a co-attack with strength n if n target instances
are handled together with the prior knowledge that they have
the same label. The new attacker loss is defined as the aver-
age of the reconstruction loss for each of the n instances. So
the objective of such co-attacker:
min
γ
1
n
n∑
i
∆(xi, G(Aγ(xi))).
Without modeling the attacker as a neural network, such
a co-attack will be difficult. We observe that in the experi-
ments, the proposed co-attack is significantly more success-
ful across models and datasets when n increases. This shows
the efficiency of co-attackers to leverage such information.
3 Experimental Results
We tested our attacks on three data sets, MNIST (LeCun et
al. 1998), fashion MNIST (Xiao, Rasul, and Vollgraf 2017).
and CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky 2009). L2 regularization is ap-
plied to weights and biases. Adam Optimizer is used with
learning rate 0.001 for the generator and 0.0001 for the dis-
criminator. Gradient penalty is applied as in (Gulrajani et al.
2017) for iWGANs. The network architecture and running
environments can be found in the supplementary materials.
We use the same number of parameters and similar network
structure for different generative models.
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Figure 2: The ROC curve of our membership attacker
against WGANs trained on MNIST.
Membership attack - MNIST After the GANs is trained,
we launch single membership attacks independently against
64 random instances of training and non-training images.
The attacker loss on each image is recorded. If the loss is
smaller than a threshold, this image is declared to be from
training dataset. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curve of such a binary classifier is plotted in Figure 2 by
changing the discriminating threshold.
From Figure 2, we observe that the ROC curve for the
GANs trained with different training data size varies signifi-
cantly. If the training dataset consists of hundreds of images,
the attacker can easily find a good seed for the generator to
reproduce the training images. Thus, there is a drastic differ-
ence in the behaviors of optimizing attacker neural networks
Aγ when it is facing a training or non-training image. This
results in high attack effectiveness for the simple binary clas-
sifier. The ROC curve indicates that the attacker can have
Table 1: Membership attack evaluation using various param-
eter setting on the MNIST and fashion MNIST measured by
AUC (trained with 800 images, 10000 steps)
MNIST fashionMNIST
Attack res iter WGAN VAE WGAN VAE
Nearest Nbr - - 0.63 0.72 0.55 0.64
Projection
2 200 0.66 0.60 0.52 0.56
4 200 0.69 0.56 0.60 0.55
10 100 0.71 0.58 0.52 0.53
10 200 0.72 0.53 0.56 0.64
1 Attack
2 200 0.76 0.79 0.65 1.0
4 200 0.75 0.87 0.67 1.0
10 100 0.76 0.94 0.69 0.99
10 200 0.74 1.00 0.71 0.99
Co-Attack
(n = 2)
2 200 0.82 0.81 0.69 1.0
4 200 0.85 0.88 0.70 1.0
10 100 0.85 0.91 0.70 0.99
10 200 0.84 0.97 0.77 1.0
Co-Attack
(n = 8)
2 200 1.0 1.0 0.53 1.0
4 200 1.0 1.0 0.51 1.0
10 100 1.0 1.0 0.62 1.0
10 200 1.0 1.0 0.60 1.0
10 400 1.0 1.0 0.72 1.0
10 800 1.0 1.0 0.80 1.0
around 80% of successful detection rate while not making
any mistake in terms of false positive. However, when the
training dataset size increases to thousands (orange and yel-
low curves), this difference vanishes. Thus, the ROC curves
are very close to the diagonal.
Comparison study For references, we compare two un-
supervised methods with ours. One is a naive baseline
method, named Nearest Neighbor, in which we simply com-
pare the given instance x with the nearest neighbor in a
set of generated data (2000 images, such that the compu-
tational cost is comparable to other methods). The mini-
mum distance is considered as the attacker loss for this base-
line attacker. The second compared target is motivated by
DefenseGAN (Samangouei, Kabkab, and Chellappa 2018),
called Direct Projection, in which we take the noise z as
trainable variables and use gradient descent to adjust the
noise directly using the new objective minz ∆(x, Gθ(z)).
This direct method is not able to launch a co-attack since
it is not possible to share information across difference in-
stances.
We compute the AUC value of our membership attack for
different neural networks (WGANs, VAEs) and report the
results in Table 1. The performance evaluation of both single
attacks and co-attacks of strength n (assuming that n-tuples
of target instances belong to the same label of training or
testing) is explained in the following. For single attacks, our
attackerAγ outperforms the nearest neighbor and direct pro-
jection across datasets and models. Our attacker is extremely
successful for VAEs. For co-attacks, our method is always
successful with AUC value nearly 1. Note that for WGANs
on fashion MNIST and Co-Attacker (n = 8), we need more
iterations because the information required for the attacker
to learn from is more. When we use 800 iterations, the co-
attack AUC can reach 80%.
For iWGANs, the results have a similar trend. Since iW-
GANs generalize better than WGANs (as shown in the sup-
plementary materials), it is harder to launch membership at-
tacks.
Membership attack - CIFAR10 For CIFAR10, the pre-
liminary results show that it is less efficient to attack GANs
trained on dataset with more than 3000 images (with AUC
of 0.57) and the attack is quite successful when the model
overfits (trained with 800 images with AUC of 0.72).
4 Discussions
4.1 Relationship between Membership Attack
and Model Generalization
One of the important issues is to understand when member-
ship attack is successful. Membership attack for classifiers
(supervised learning) was shown to be closely related to the
generalization capability of the model (Yeom, Fredrikson,
and Jha 2017). As to generative models, there has not been
an explicit discussion of how to relate model generalization
with membership attack yet. Intuitively, we want a general-
izing model to have similar training and testing reconstruc-
tion loss – the attacker is equally able to reproduce a train-
ing/testing image. Note that this generalization condition is
only a necessary condition for distribution learning. A gen-
erator that is able to produce every element in the data dis-
tribution µreal (i.e., the generator ‘covers’ all samples with
non-zero measures in µreal) cannot guarantee that it is gener-
ating the samples according to the distribution µreal.
Now, we make this intuition precise by measuring the
generalization gap of a generative modelGθ to by the differ-
ence between the expected attacker loss on the training data
(the finite samples) X and non-training data (testing data not
used by the training procedure) µreal−X which comes from
the same underlying data distribution µreal:
Ex∼µreal−X min
γ
∆(x, Gθ(Aγ(x)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
attacker loss on testing images
−Ex∼X min
γ
∆(x, Gθ(Aγ(x)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
attacker loss on training images
(3)
Generalization Gap. In supervised learning, we observe
that for a given hypothesis class of classifiers, the gener-
alization gap decreases when the number of training data
increases. With the proposed generalization error for gen-
erative model, we find a similar pattern in Figure 3a. For
WGANs model trained on MNIST data and stopped after
2000 training steps, the generalization gap diminishes when
we use thousands of training data. We also plot the success
rate of the membership attacks. The success rate of member-
ship attacks and generalization gap are strongly correlated.
This can be shown in Figure 3a. The experimental details of
this figure are the same as those described in Section 3.
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(a) Generalization gap and membership attack re-
sult. The two attacker losses (with vertical bars show-
ing one standard deviation) approach each other with
more training data. Meanwhile, the success (AUC) of
the membership attack is diminishing.
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Figure 3: Generalization of WGANs on MNIST. The y-axis
shows the attacker loss in Eqn 1. The blue curve and red
curve show the average attacker loss for training data and
non-training data respectively.
Early Stopping. On the other hand, the learning curve in
Figure 3b depicts how the training and testing errors behave
when the number of training steps increases. For deep learn-
ing, the curve provides an early stopping scheme to prevent
overfitting. As to the case of generative model, the training
error also decreases steadily while the testing error increases
again after some steps. This shows that generative model is
easily overfitting (over-train).
4.2 Diversity
Dispersion. A desirable property of a generative model
is the capability of generating versatile samples. This is
termed diversity in the literature. The evaluation of diver-
sity, however, has not reached a consensus in the commu-
nity. In particular, an obvious failing mode to avoid is that
the GAN can memorize the training data and simply re-
port the training samples. There have been a number of pro-
posed methods to test whether this is the case. For exam-
ple, one test checks each generated image whether it is sim-
ilar to any in the training data. Another test considers tak-
ing two random seeds s1, s2 and checks if the interpolation
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Figure 4: k-dispersion of 3000 generated images from iW-
GANs trained with different data sizes.
λs1+(1−λ)s2 for λ ∈ [0, 1] generates realistic outputs. Ac-
tually, no measure of diversity is explicitly defined. In a very
recent work (Arora, Risteski, and Zhang 2018), the authors
have proposed to use a birthday paradox test: if the GAN
has simply memorized the n training sample and randomly
output one each time, then with roughly
√
n samples in the
output there is a good chance that two of them are the same.
It is then suggested in (Arora, Risteski, and Zhang 2018) to
visually examine the images to identify duplicates.
Here we use a geometric measure of diversity, called dis-
persion, which seeks for a subset of k images in the gener-
ated output XG that are far away from each other feature-
wisely.
disp(k;XG) = max
x1,...,xk∈XG
min
i,j∈[n]
∆(xi,xj)
If the output images are concentrated around a small num-
ber of ` samples, then the dispersion will dramatically drop
when k goes beyond `. In Figure 4, we can observe such pat-
terns. For GANs trained with 8 and 80 images, they are not
able to generate diversified images so that their dispersion is
significantly lower than that of the testing dataset.
(a) Training data
size = 8
(b) Training data
size = 80
(c) Training data
size = 800
Figure 5: t-SNE visualization of training images (in red),
generated images (in green) and images from real distribu-
tion (in black) for iWGANs trained with different sizes of
training data.
Connection with Generalization. When a model gener-
alizes, the dispersion of the generated data is similar to the
dispersion of the data distribution. In Section 4.1, the gener-
alization gap becomes smaller while we have more training
data. So one can produce diversified data that are not seen in
the training data. Data dispersion serves as an evidence for
such diversification. When a generative model is successful,
it should interpolate or even extrapolate beyond the original
training data which results in a larger data dispersion.
In Figure 5, we visualize dispersion by embedding the
generated images and the training data on a two-dimensional
map using t-SNE (Maaten and Hinton 2008). The red dots
are the training data, the number of which is the only chang-
ing variable in the subfigures. The green dots show the 3000
generated images sampled from the GANs after training.
The black dots represent 3000 samples from the real dis-
tribution. When there are only a small number of training
images, the generated samples heavily concentrate around
the training data which produces a small dispersion. Once
the number of training data is 800, the dispersion of the gen-
erated data and original data becomes similar.
4.3 Diversity versus Generalization
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(b) Membership Attack with Adversarial Sampling
Figure 6: Adversarial sampling versus random sampling for
diversity and generalization.
It is interesting to ask whether diversity and generalization
capabilities are the same. In the literature, diversity has been
one of the most desirable properties of generative models.
And it is tempting to conclude that a model with good di-
versity has good generalization. In this section, we point out
that these two measures (goals) are not always aligned. One
could carefully choose training data so that diversity is en-
hanced yet generalization is hurt – i.e., membership attacks
are more likely to be successful.
For example, when we take a batch of data that have not
been used in the training, {xi}bi=1, and assign a ranking to
Table 2: Network architecture
WGANs / VAEs Adversary
Generator/Decoder Discriminator/Encoder Attacker
FC 1024. ReLU, BN. Conv [4× 4], stride=2, 64. ReLU. FC 100.
FC 7× 7× 128. ReLU, BN. Conv [4× 4], stride=2, 128. ReLU. FC 100.
Transpose Conv [4× 4], stride= 2, 64. ReLU, BN. FC 1024. ReLU. FC | z |.
Transpose Conv [4× 4], stride= 2,32. ReLU, BN. FC 1 Conv [4× 4], channel=1. Tanh
them by the decreasing order of the attacker loss (Eqn 1)
with respect to the current generator. We include the one
ranked highest (the one that is the least reproducible) in X′.
Then we modify the current GAN by training on all data in
the current batch and repeat the above procedure. Eventu-
ally, we have a subset X′ that is the hardest one to reproduce
in the process.
After the sampling algorithm has completed, a subset of
data points X′ ⊂ X is collected from the real distribution
µreal. Now we train a GAN from scratch using data in X′.
In comparison, we also train a separate GAN using a set Y
with |Y | = |X′ |, randomly selected from X. We denote
X′ to be obtained by adversarial sampling and Y as random
sampling.
Hereafter, we compare the dispersion and membership at-
tack on GANs trained with adversarial sampling and uni-
form sampling. The dispersion of generated data using Y
is even higher than the dispersion of the original training
data (Figure 6a). But in terms of membership attack, GANs
trained by adversarial samples are much worse (Figure 6b).
One way to understand this result is that the adversarial sam-
ples might have paid too much attention on extreme cases
while random sampling is a better representation of µreal.
4.4 Network architecture
The network architecture used in our experiments can be
found in Table 2. For the deep learning framework and hard-
ware, TensorFlow is used to implement the deep neural net-
works. The training is done on a Nvidia Tesla K40c GPU.
4.5 Experimental Results on VAEs
The results for VAEs are provided in the supplementary ma-
terials. It is commonly observed in practice that VAEs gener-
ate blurry images (Zhao, Song, and Ermon 2017). This phe-
nomena is also captured by the low dispersion of the gener-
ated images. We have found the fact that even when VAEs
are trained with thousands of MNIST images, it cannot reach
the same dispersion as their GANs counterpart. There is a
gap between dispersion of the original data distribution and
the synthetic distribution by VAEs.
Similarly, when more training data is used, VAEs are
more resilient to membership attacks. Furthermore, we have
learned that the generalization gap is generally higher than
the corresponding GANs using the same number of train-
ing images. This is consistent to the results in Table 1; thus,
indicating attacks to VAEs are easier.
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Figure 7: VAE results.
4.6 Experimental Results on iWGANs
The attacker AUC and generalization gap for iWGANs, with
different number of training data, is presented in Figure 8.
Generally speaking iWGANs have smaller generalization
gap (higher resilience to membership attacks) compared to
WGANs, when the same number of training data is used.
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Figure 8: Generalization gap & attacker AUC.
5 Conclusion
Privacy of training data is an important issue in learning so
how to protect data privacy is a natural next step. The work
in the paper is largely empirical as many papers on gener-
ative models. We hope this work encourage more works on
this important topic.
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